




Synthetic Biology and Dual Use



Marcus Schmidt, Ph.D.

Co-Founder

*Organization for International Dialogue and
Conflict Management*

Synthetic Biology and Dual Use

Promises and risks




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What is synthetic biology ?


- Design and construction of new biological parts, devices, and systems
- Re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes.
- Top-down ('subtraction') *and* Bottom-up ('addition') approach for constructing new devices and materials
- Orthogonal and/or xenobiological systems



Synthetic Biology



- Idea



- Design



- Construction



DNA molecules with any desired sequence can be ordered overnight by labworkers
In near future cells expressing desired sequences can be ordered

Classical Engineering



Synthetic biology: *in vivo* versus *in vitro*

- In vivo*:
- top-down
 - cell-based engineering (chassis)
 - driven by developments in systems biology, recombinant-DNA, synthesis of genes, ..

- In vitro*:
- bottom up
 - bio-inspired materials, devices
 - driven by developments in synthetic and systems chemistry

Engineering principles and standardization are relevant for both *in vivo* and *in vitro* approaches

Examples of useful applications:

- New drugs
- Drugs produced in novel more efficient way
- Novel drug delivery systems (Red Biotech)
- Cell factories for biofuel
- Cell factories for platform chemicals (White Biotech)
- Bacteria for bioremediation (Green Biotech)
- Designer bacteria
- Fast evolution methods
- Electronic devices; biosensors
- Nanomotors
- Etc.

Safety and security risks posed by synthetic biology

- Pathogen engineering or design (e.g. novel genomes, MDR)
- Virus engineering or design and construction
- Toxin production, novel molecules
- Etc.

Ways of release:


- unintended release into environment (e.g. lab-accident)
- intended benign use (e.g. gene therapy, crop protection)
- bioterrorism / biowarfare (pathogens, viruses, toxins)

Synthetic virus

Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template

Jeronimo Cello, Aniko V. Paul, Eckard Wimmer*

Full-length poliovirus complementary DNA (cDNA) was synthesized by assembling oligonucleotides that were translated and replicated in cells to generate infectious virus. The virus was used for the synthesis of antibodies and CD155 transgenic chickens. The synthesis of infectious virus by following



Science 2002

Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus


Terrence M. Tumpey,^{1*} Christopher F. Basler,² Patricia V. Aguilar,² Hui Zeng,¹ Alicia Solórzano,² David E. Swayne,⁴ Nancy J. Cox,¹ Jacqueline M. Katz,¹ Jeffery K. Taubenberger,³ Peter Palese,² Adolfo García-Sastre²



Science 2005

Novel (super)viruses

- Mousepox with Interleukin 4
 - Jackson et al. 2001. J. of Virology
 - US military
 - Rabbitpox with Interleukin 4
 - Cowpox with Interleukin 4
- Bat SARS-like coronavirus „humanized“
 - Becker et al. 2008. PNAS
- Reconstitution of infectious, human „fossil“ endogenous retrovirus
 - Wimmer et al. 2009. Nat Biotech



Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness In Europe

Dr. Alexander Kelle

The IASB Code of Conduct for Best Practices in Gene Synthesis

Cambridge, MA. Nov. 3, 2009

nature

OPINION

Inkeel, The J. Craig Venter Institute, Rockville, Maryland, **Drew Endy**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, **Harald L. Epstein**, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, District of Columbia and **Robert M.** Craig Venter Institute, Rockville, Maryland

Biologists napping while work militarized

As researchers discover more agents that alter mental states, the Chemical Weapons Convention needs modification to help ensure that the life sciences are not used for hostile purposes, says **Malcolm Dando**.

Chapter 7 Security Issues Related to Synthetic Biology Between Threat Perceptions and Governance Options

Alexander Kelle

October 2007

J. Craig Venter
INSTITUTE

CSIS
MIT

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Office of the Secretary

Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers

AGENCY: Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of the Secretary.

ACTION: Notice.


Authority: Public Health Service Act, 42
U.S.C. 241, Section 301; HSPD-10.

- Wellcome Trust project "Building a sustainable capacity in dual-use bioethics"
www.dual-usebioethics.net


SynMod (ESF Synthetic Biology project)

Synthetic biology to obtain novel antibiotics
and optimized production systems

Sven Panke (ETH, Zurich/Basel)
Oscar Kuipers (University of Groningen)
Fritz Gotz (Univ. Tuebingen)
Markus Schmidt (IDC, Vienna)
Ralf Wagner (GENEART, Germany)
Nicolas Szita (Uni. College London)




Need for novel antibiotics




Source: CDC


Class I



Class II



Class III



Willey et al. 2007 Annu Rev. Microbiol.

- Potent antimicrobials against Gram positive bacteria
- Low resistance development
- High stability
- Non-toxic for eukaryotes
- Enormous combinatorial potential
- Ongoing clinical trials

Mode of action

- Lipid II
- Pore forming




Image from Breukink et al 2004

Synthetic biology to obtain novel antibiotics and optimized production systems

Goals:

- Design, develop and produce novel antimicrobial compounds based on lantibiotic elements
- Develop and use novel HT screening methods
- Screen for desired characteristics (activity against Multidrug-resistant bacteria; low level of resistance development; stable, soluble, good pharmacokinetics)
- Develop highly efficient production host (*Staphylococcus carnosus*)
- Production of >3 highly potent antimicrobials for further (clinical) trials and structural characterization
- Address risks, ethical and societal issues

Criteria for medical use

- Pharmacokinetics
- Solubility and Stability (chemical; proteolysis)
- Toxicity, allergenicity
- Efficacy
- Safety


Benefits

- Novel antibiotics
- Less resistance, less MDR

Concerns and risks


- Unwanted activity against eukaryotes (toxins)
- Too stable

Lantibiotic precursor libraries



Synthetic collections of building block modules with and without random non-wt substitutions

Ralf Wagner




Ligation into reporter vector and screening for constructs with open reading frames

Biosafety, Ethics, and Public Perception

Dr Markus Schmidt, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict Management, Vienna, Austria



- Analysing safety issues in SYNMOD
- Focusing on the ethical dimension
- Collaboration with other ELSI initiatives
- Communication and Dissemination
- Public panel debates / focusgroups on novel antibiotics
- Short documentary film on synthetic antibiotics
- Preparation of information material for the press/public



Awareness raising

- Increase awareness among life scientists, engineers, computer scientists about biosecurity, safety and ethical aspects of their work.
- Should be part of educational program
- Code of conduct / ethics

Acknowledgements:

Bert Poolman

Sven Panke

iGEM